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Introduction
Because genocide studies came to prominence in the 1990s, it has been argued,1 it developed within
the particular theoretical confines of the time and missed earlier turns in the humanities and social
sciences such as those associated with Marxism, feminism or post-structuralism. Sabby Sagall’s Final
Solutions is an ambitious attempt at rectifying the omission of the Marxist theoretical programme
in the analysis of genocide. In particular, he seeks to demonstrate the significance and value of the
marriage of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung, better
known as the Frankfurt School. This body of work, Sagall attempts to demonstrate, possesses a
great deal of potential in terms of its capacity to shed light on the interrelationship between the
objective-historical and subjective-psychological factors of collective violence. It is an ambitious
book that, whilst possessing shortcomings, is a welcome addition to the literature on genocide.
Sagall’s point of departure is that “only by organically linking elements from history, social
theory, economics and psychology” (3) can we come to an understanding of genocide. The
theoretical perspective most suitable for this task, the author argues, is Marxism, particularly its
synthesis with psychoanalysis. To this end, he makes use of the valuable resources offered by Marx
and Freud, as well as thinkers like Wilhelm Reich, and Frankfurt School intellectuals such as Erich
Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. This is a welcome development because, as far as representations
in genocide studies go, Adorno and Horkheimer and their Dialectic of Enlightenment has tended
to comprise the sole inclusion of Frankfurt School thinkers into central debates in the study of
genocide, particularly those regarding the relationship between genocide and modernity. In the
work of Reich and Fromm, as the author augurs, are found very useful tools which can be put to use
in order to illuminate how socio-economic structures and processes, funnelled through the microsocial unit of the family, embed themselves in the psyche of individuals. Sagall also incorporates
the analyses of a “second generation” of psychoanalytic Marxists such as Reuben Osborn, Joel
Kovel and Eugene Wolfenstein (to name a few), as well as post-Freudian psychoanalysts like
Melanie Klein.
The book is split into two parts of four chapters each. The first outlines the theoretical framework
of the study over four chapters. Firstly, under the heading “Why do People Kill People?” Sagall
reviews a number of interpretations of the macro features of genocide in different disciplines and
identifies their strengths and weaknesses. He then goes on to discuss representatives of the microanalysis of genocide under the title “Killers on the Couch.” These first two chapters set up Sagall’s
own contribution, borne of a dissatisfaction with those who “affirm that destructiveness is an
ineradicable part of human nature as against those who seek its roots in social conditions” (68).
In the third chapter, “What Makes Killers Tick?” the author lays out his own approach,
introducing Erich Fromm’s notion of “social character,” predominantly reproduced in the family
unit, which operates as a mediating link between the poles of social structure and individual
agency. Collectivities are characterised as possessing a “social character” which can sometimes
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contain a predisposition for genocidal aggression. However, this predisposition is activated only
in certain precipitating circumstances, particularly in humiliating military defeats and social and
economic crises. This is a laudable move, and Sagall draws on a considerable breadth of thinkers
and concepts to good effect. However, bold claims like “to my knowledge, no work attempting to
link the objective and the subjective reasons for genocide has been done since the 1970s” (7) seem
over pronounced. One figure who is not mentioned in this equation is the sociologist Norbert Elias,
whose systematic theory of civilizing and decivilizing processes (particularly in his writings on
Germany), is evoked by Sagall’s desire to link the historical and psychological levels of genocide
but is not engaged.2
In the fourth chapter, the final in the expository section of the thesis, Sagall discusses the
notion of “Killing Things.” Under capitalism, human beings become reified and appear as objects
“perceived and defined in terms of their exchange-value, their price or cost, not their usefulness
or intrinsic value as individual persons or objects, that is, their use value” (95). Thus, genocide is a
killing of dehumanised “things” rather than people. Of the opening chapters, although intriguing,
this is the least developed in terms of how it is later explored in the case studies.
The second part of the book constitutes a comparative study of four cases of genocide against
which to test the framework; the Native American genocide, the Armenian genocide, the Nazi
Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. These cases are well put together, if a little loosely organized.
In the case of the Native American genocide, Sagall takes care to differentiate the experience of the
native populations of the Americas in their contact with social groups from Europe, possessing
distinct “social characters,” rather than generalising them both under a singular European
coloniser (124). On the Armenian Genocide, Sagall documents how political, social and military
disintegration, bought forth by varying crises, fostered violent behaviour among Young Turks:
“As their inner world became more and more threatening they dealt with it by developing a social
character that combined two main features: a hoarding mode of assimilation as they struggled to
hang on to the glories of the Ottoman past; and a mode of relatedness that became increasingly
authoritarian and destructive, brimming over with narcissistic rage, the obverse of their grandiose
sense of self” (182). In the chapter on the Nazi Genocide, the author situates his own argument in
relation to the longstanding intentionalist-functionalist debate in Holocaust scholarship. Following
Michael Mann’s idea that genocide normally constitutes a sort of “plan C,” Sagall demonstrates how
the Nazi genocide moved through successive phases of “problem-solving.” That is, genocidal intent
emerged in the context of shifting material circumstances and contingencies, each aggravating a
predisposing “authoritarian social character.” He finally turns his attention to Rwanda, concluding
that “the Hutus were, arguably, people with powerful and rigid super-egos, unstable ids, and weak
egos. However, in the orgy of killing, the super-ego transmitted the order to kill Tutsis, prompting
the id to jettison its ‘normal’ everyday life drive and morph into its destructive self” (246).
Though in many ways an effective exploration of the cases aided by the theoretical framework
developed in the first section, this part of the book nevertheless possesses shortcomings. Firstly,
like the first section, it contains sections that seem digressive (for instance, the descriptive tracts
on the Quakers in the chapter on genocide in the Americas and on the Madagascar plan in the
chapter on the Nazi genocide). The case study struggles at times to reconcile the tension between
historical description and theoretical cogency that is characteristic of this sort of ambitious
empirically-informed conceptual work. Sagall also affords too much coherence and corporeality
to social groups, making large generalisations on the basis of their purported social character.
This is an ethical and representational issue as much as an empirical one. For instance, as Lee Ann
Fujii has demonstrated,3 although tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu participated in the 1994
genocide, many more did not kill. A further problem with this section is that it does not sufficiently
take into account the transformations in global capitalism over the duration of his case studies,
from its expansion into the New World from the 15th century to the imposition of IMF structural
adjustment programmes in Rwanda towards the end of the 20th.
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In general, Sagall provides a persuasive argument that navigates the pitfalls of “sociological
reductionism,” that is affording an over-determining capacity to social structures and processes
whilst downplaying how “external, material conditions become translated into the psyche of
an individual” (5), as well as of “psychological reductionism,” that is the “divorce of history
from psychology … reducing historical phenomena to the psychology of the protagonists and,
conversely, failing to locate their individual psychology within the wider society and its politics”
(6). Psychoanalysis provides a way of exploring the “irrational” dimension of genocide, that which
cannot be adequately addressed by recourse to economic or political explanations.
The distinction between rational and irrational motives for genocide is the most contentious
area of the work. As Sagall defines it: “One can … distinguish between, on the one hand, economic
and political genocides, which do have a ‘rational’ or utilitarian basis, and, on the other, those that
have little or no instrumental explanation, and can therefore be deemed ‘irrational,’ explicable if
not only, then largely, in psychological terms” (9). Though Sagall returns to this distinction at other
points in the work, it is not sufficiently elucidated. Firstly, in addition to the moot question of
whether “rationality” can be disentangled from its normative connotations (thus running the risk
of rendering some genocides more understandable, even acceptable, than others), those so-called
“rational” modern atrocities identified are those most uneasily situated historically in relation to
communism, such as those in Cambodia and the Soviet Union.
There is also a sense in which the distinction of the terms “rational” and “irrational” would have
been better developed in dialogue with works in genocide studies that explicitly address notions
of rationality. Jacques Sémelin’s notion of “delusional rationality” is unacknowledged,4 and the
idea of the dark potentiality of “instrumental rationality” which permeates Zygmunt Bauman’s
analysis in Modernity and the Holocaust is not satisfactorily broached. Given the significance
Sagall attributes to rationality, it is surprising that the book omits a consideration of Max Weber’s
influence on the Frankfurt School, a figure who might be said to be comparable in influence to that
of Marx and Freud, particularly his ideas on the irrationality of processes of modern rationalization.
This is an idea that pervades Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, a book that
strangely does not get much of a hearing in a book so influenced by the Frankfurt School.
Nevertheless, overall the book is a welcome contribution to genocide studies. It will be
particularly useful for those readers who are interested in recent debates in genocide studies
concerning the relationship between structural violence and genocide. Even taking into account its
flaws, Sagall’s study should be applauded for its attempt to link the violence of economic systems
to the brute physical violence of genocide in a non-reductionist way.
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